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Abstract
Algorithmic trading systems are often completely
automated, and deep learning is increasingly re-
ceiving attention in this domain. Nonetheless,
little is known about the robustness properties
of these models. We study valuation models for
algorithmic trading from the perspective of adver-
sarial machine learning. We introduce new attacks
specific to this domain with size constraints that
minimize attack costs. We further discuss how
these attacks can be used as an analysis tool to
study and evaluate the robustness properties of
financial models. Finally, we investigate the feasi-
bility of realistic adversarial attacks in which an
adversarial trader fools automated trading systems
into making inaccurate predictions.
1. Introduction
Machine learning serves an increasingly large role in finan-
cial applications. Recent trends have seen finance profes-
sionals rely on automated machine learning systems for algo-
rithmic trading (Almgren & Chriss, 2001), as robo-advisers
that allocate investments and rebalance portfolios (Moyer,
2015; Meola, 2017), in fraud detection systems that iden-
tify illicit transactions (Bhattacharyya et al., 2011; Abdallah
et al., 2016; Randhawa et al., 2018), for risk models that
approve/deny loans (Binns, 2017), and in high-frequency
trading systems that make decisions on timescales that can-
not be checked by humans (Hendershott et al., 2011; Angel
& McCabe, 2013; Are´valo et al., 2016; Avramovic et al.,
2017; Klaus & Elzweig, 2017; Borovkova & Tsiamas, 2019).
With the widespread use of such models, it is increasingly
important to have tools for analyzing their security and reli-
ability.
In the mainstream machine learning literature, it is widely
known that many machine learning models are susceptible
to adversarial attacks in which small but deliberately cho-
*Equal contribution, 1University of Maryland, 2Rice University.
Correspondence to: Micah Goldblum <goldblum@umd.edu>.
sen perturbations to model inputs result in dramatic changes
to model outputs (Kurakin et al., 2016). It has already
been demonstrated that adversarial attacks can be used to
change someone’s identity in a facial recognition system
(Sharif et al., 2016), bypass copyright detection systems
(Saadatpanah et al., 2019), and interfere with object detec-
tors (Eykholt et al., 2018). In this work, we investigate adver-
sarial attacks on models for algorithmic and high-frequency
trading.
Trading bots historically rely on simple ML models and
increasingly leverage the cutting-edge performance of neu-
ral networks (Borovkova & Tsiamas, 2019; Are´valo et al.,
2016). Security and reliability issues are particularly rele-
vant to high-frequency trading (HFT) systems, as actions
are determined and executed in extremely short periods.
These short time horizons make it impossible for human
intervention to prevent deleterious behavior, and it is known
that unstable behaviors and security vulnerabilities in such
systems have contributed to major market events (e.g., the
2010 “flash crash” (Kirilenko et al., 2017)).
We focus on adversarial attacks on the stock price prediction
systems employed by trading bots. We look at adversarial
attacks from the following two perspectives.
Adversarial analysis of reliability and stability: After a
price prediction model has been trained, it is important to
understand the reliability of the model and any unseen insta-
bilities or volatile behaviors it may have. A naive analysis
method is backtesting; one feeds recent historical stock
market data into a model and examines its outputs. How-
ever, models may have extreme behaviors and instabili-
ties that arise during deployment that cannot be observed
using historical data. This is especially true when com-
plex and uninterpretable neural models are used (Szegedy
et al., 2013). Furthermore, market conditions can change
rapidly, resulting in a domain shift that degrades model
performance (De Prado, 2018; Pedersen, 2019).
We propose the use of adversarial attacks to reveal the most
extreme behaviors a model may have. Our adversarial at-
tacks generate synthetic market conditions under which
models behave poorly, and determine whether instabilities
exist in which small changes to input data result in extreme
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or undesirable behavior. This can be used as a tool to in-
terrogate the reliability of a model before deployment or
during postmortem analysis after a major event.
Adversarial attacks as a security vulnerability: We as-
sess the potential for adversarial attacks to be used by ma-
licious agents to manipulate trading bots. Several factors
contribute to the potential vulnerability of stock price mod-
els. In mainstream adversarial literature, the attacker often
cannot directly control model inputs; the adversary modifies
a physical object (e.g., a stop sign) with the hopes that their
perturbation remains adversarial after the object is imaged
under unknown conditions. By contrast, our adversary is
blessed with the ability to directly control model inputs.
When order book data is used for price prediction, law-
abiding traders and malicious actors alike receive identical
market data from an exchange. The adversary can perturb
the order book by placing (and canceling) their own or-
ders. These adversarial orders quickly appear on the public
exchange and are fed directly into victim models.
At the same time, there are challenges to attacks on or-
der book data. An adversary’s malicious orders must be
bounded in their financial cost and detectability. Moreover,
the attacker cannot know the future of the stock market, and
so they must rely on universal attacks that remain adver-
sarial under a wide range of stock market behaviors. An
adversary’s knowledge of the victim model is also limited,
thus we assess the effectiveness of these universal attacks
across model architectures as well.
Interestingly, when the attacks are deployed on historical
market data, we observe that adversarial algorithms can
automatically discover known manipulation strategies used
by humans in “spoofing”. These attacks are known to be
effective and problematic, spawning their ban in the Dodd-
Frank Act of 2010 (Henning, 2018).
2. Background
Before discussing new methods, we briefly review relevant
existing work on algorithmic trading and adversarial attacks.
2.1. Machine Learning for High-Frequency Trading
High-frequency trading bots can profit from extremely short-
term arbitrage opportunities in which a stock price is pre-
dicted from immediately available information, or by re-
ducing the market impact of a large transaction block by
breaking it into many small transactions over a trading day
(Hendershott et al., 2011; Angel & McCabe, 2013; Klaus &
Elzweig, 2017; Byrd & Balch, 2019).
High-frequency trading systems contain a complex pipeline
that includes price prediction and execution logic. Price pre-
diction models (often called “valuations”) are a fundamental
part of any trading system; they forecast the future value of
equities and quantify uncertainty. Execution logic consists
of proprietary buy/sell rules that account for firm-specific
factors including transaction costs, price-time priority of
orders, latency, and regulatory constraints (De Prado, 2018).
Since the ability to anticipate trends is the core of algorith-
mic trading, we focus on price prediction and its vulnerabil-
ity to attack. Price predictors use various streams of time-
series data to predict the future value of assets. Traditional
systems use linear models, such as autoregressive moving-
average (ARMA) and support-vector machine (SVM), since
linear models like these are fast for both training and infer-
ence (Beck et al., 2013; Kercheval & Zhang, 2015).
As hardware capabilities increase, training and inference
are accelerated by advances in GPU, FPGA, and ASIC
technologies. Heavyweight models, like neural networks,
have gathered interest as computations that were once in-
tractable on a short timescale are becoming feasible (Dixon,
2018). Recent works use LSTM and temporal convolutional
networks to predict future prices in a short time horizon
(Borovkova & Tsiamas, 2019; Are´valo et al., 2016).
Common trading strategies, typical of technical analysis,
rely on mean-reversion or momentum-following algorithms
to identify an oversold or overbought asset. Mean-reversion
methods assume that fluctuations in stock prices will eventu-
ally relax to their corresponding long-term average, whereas
momentum-following methods aim at identifying and fol-
lowing persistent trends in asset prices. Simple trading
algorithms identify an indicator of either strategy and act
when prices cross a predefined threshold, thus signaling for
a potentially profitable trade over the oversold or overbought
asset (Murphy, 1999; Cohen et al., 2019). We use this type
of thresholding for our trading systems. More details on our
setup can be found in Section 3.2.
Historically, traders have engaged in spoofing in which an
adversary places orders on either side of the best price to
fake supply or demand, often with the intent of canceling
the orders before execution (Sar, 2017). Orders placed
by a trader engaging in spoofing can be thought of as a
naive hand-crafted adversarial perturbation. In this work,
we use techniques from mathematical optimization to auto-
mate the construction of effective and efficient perturbations.
Spoofing is now illegal under the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010.
However, our perturbations, crafted with optimization tech-
niques, may be less detectable than handcrafted versions
and thus may present a problem for enforcement.
2.2. Adversarial Attacks
While it is known that neural networks are vulnerable to
small perturbations to inputs that dramatically change a net-
work’s output, the most popular setting for studying these
Adversarial Attacks on Machine Learning Systems for High-Frequency Trading
adversarial attacks to date is image classification. Adver-
sarial attacks in this domain perturb an image to fool a
classifier while constraining the perturbation to be small in
some norm.
While classical adversarial perturbations are designed for a
single image, “universal” perturbations are crafted to fool
the classifier when applied to nearly any image (Moosavi-
Dezfooli et al., 2017; Shafahi et al., 2018). Similar attacks
exist for other vision tasks like detection and segmentation
(Xie et al., 2017). Other domains, such as natural language
and graph structured data, have attracted the attention of
adversarial attacks, but these attacks are impractical (Alzan-
tot et al., 2018; Dai et al., 2018). For example, in NLP,
adversarial text may be nonsensical, and in graph structured
data, attackers are weak.
2.3. The Order Book
The order book keeps track of buy orders and sell orders
for a financial asset on an exchange. We use limit order
book data from the Nasdaq Stock Exchange. Limit orders
are orders in which an agent either offers to buy shares of a
stock at or below a specified price or offers to sell shares of
a stock at or above a specified price. Since agents can place,
for example, buy orders at a low price, limit orders may not
execute immediately and can remain in the order book for a
long time. When the best buy order price (the highest price
at which someone will buy) matches or exceeds the best sell
order price (the lowest price at which someone is willing to
sell) orders are filled and leave the book.
At any given time, the order book contains prices and their
corresponding sizes. Size refers to the total number of shares
being offered or demanded at a particular price. The size
entries for a given price level may contain orders of many
agents, and these orders are typically filled in a first-in-first-
out manner. More complex rules come into play when, e.g.,
orders require tie breaking, or limit orders have stipulations
on their execution. A complete list of market practices and
conduct standards can be found in the official Nasdaq equity
rules (Kluwer, 2020).
3. Building valuation models
In this section, we describe simple valuation models that
we attack. Our models digest a time series of size-weighted
average price levels over a one minute interval, and make a
prediction about a stock price ten seconds in the future. The
models used here were chosen for their simplicity – they
are meant to form a testbed for adversarial attacks and not
to compete with the proprietary state of the art. Still, we
verify that our models learn from patterns in the data and
out-perform simple baselines.
3.1. Data
We use centisecond-resolution data from September and
October 2019, and we choose to only use the first hour
of trading each day since this period contains the largest
volume of activity. Taking one month of data per asset, we
use the first sixteen trading days for training and the last
four for testing. We choose well-known stocks with high
volatility relative to order book thickness: Ford (F), General
Electric (GE), and Nvidia (NVDA). Order book data was
furnished by LOBSTER, a financial data aggregator that
makes historical order book data for Nasdaq assets available
for academic use (Huang & Polak, 2011).
Consider that each row of the order book contains
the ten best buy prices and their corresponding sizes,
{(pB1 , sB1 ), ..., (pB10, sB10)}, as well as the ten best sell prices
and their corresponding sizes, {(pS1 , sS1 ), ..., (pS10, sS10)}.
These rows are each a snapshot of the book at a particu-
lar time. We process this data by creating the size-weighted
average (SWA),
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for each row. Movement in the size-weighted average may
represent a shift in either or both price and size. The SWA
is a univariate surrogate for the price of an asset.
After computing SWAs of the order book data, inputs to the
models are 60 second time-series of this one-dimensional
data. Since we use order book snapshots at intervals of 0.01
seconds, an input contains 60× 100 = 6, 000 SWA entries.
See Figure 1 for a visual depiction of the SWA time-series.
We focus on three-class classification models for concrete-
ness. The goal of the model is to classify an equity as likely
to increase in price above a threshold, decrease below a
threshold, or remain between the thresholds. Thresholds are
chosen to be symmetric around the origin, and so that the
default class (“no significant change”) contains one third of
all events, making the classification problem approximately
balanced.
3.2. Trading Models
On each asset, we train a linear classifier, a multi-layer per-
ceptron (MLP), and an LSTM (Hochreiter & Schmidhuber,
1997). The MLP models have 4 hidden layers, each of width
8,000. The LSTM models have 3 layers and a hidden-layer
size of 100.
We train each model with cross-entropy loss over the three
classes. Since our data can be sampled by taking any 60
second snippet from the first hour of any of the trading days
in our training set, we have a large number of data points.
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Figure 1. This sample of the SWA curve for GE data shows an
example of an input snippet. The label for this input is determined
by the change in price from the right end of the green snippet to
the green dot.
We randomly choose a batch of 60-second snippets from all
of the training data and perform one iteration of SGD on
this batch before resampling. These batches range in size
from 2,000 to 3,000 data points depending on the model.
Further details can be found in Appendix A.1.
3.3. Comparison to baselines
The performance of our models is reported as classification
accuracy on testing data. Since we have a large quantity of
data, we randomly sample 10,000 snippets from the test set
and form confidence intervals of radius one standard error
from the accuracy estimations.
We verify that our models are indeed learning from the
data by checking that they exceed simple baselines. See
Table 1 for the numerical results. There are two natural
baselines for this problem: a random guess, and a strategy
that always predicts the label most commonly associated
with that stock in the training data.1 The latter baseline
always performed worse than a random guess on the test
data, so the most natural performance baseline accuracy
is 33.33%. Tables 1 and 2 show accuracy measurements
which should be read with this in mind. Note that price
prediction is a difficult task, and profitable valuation models
typically achieve performance only a few percentage points
better than baselines (Byrd & Balch, 2019).
4. Analyzing the Vulnerabilities of Trading
Models
In this section, we develop a basic adversarial attack, and we
use it to study the robustness properties of trading models
1Our classes are designed so that the middle class (little to no
change in the SWA) accounts for one third of the training data.
This leaves the ‘up’ and ‘down’ classes slightly off balance.
FORD (F)
MODEL TEST ACCURACY(%)
LINEAR 34.66(±0.5)
MLP 36.56(±0.5)
LSTM 36.40(±0.5)
GENERAL ELECTRIC (GE)
MODEL TEST ACCURACY (%)
LINEAR 36.41(±0.5)
MLP 36.87(±0.5)
LSTM 35.65(±0.5)
NVIDIA (NVDA)
MODEL TEST ACCURACY (%)
LINEAR 34.15(±0.5)
MLP 35.69(±0.5)
LSTM 37.11(±0.5)
Table 1. Accuracy of each model on test data with confidence inter-
vals of radius one standard error. Note that all models are perform-
ing pattern recognition as described in Section 3.2. Furthermore,
the neural network models outperform the linear ones.
as well as to compare the sensitivities of different networks.
One might think that because these models are trained on
noisy data, they are insensitive to small perturbations. We
demonstrate that the networks are indeed vulnerable.
4.1. Rules for Perturbing the Order Book
A number of unique complexities arise when crafting adver-
sarial attacks on order book data. We consider an adversary
that places orders at the ten best buy and sell prices (orders
at extreme price levels are typically discarded by analysts
as they are unlikely to be executed). Equivalently, we can
perturb the size entries upwards, but only to whole numbers,
in raw order book data.
Note that using the SWA as input and only raising size
entries prevents the adversary from making too great an
impact on the data seen by the model. Since the SWA lacks
the informational content of raw order book data, an attacker,
without changing the price entries, can at most perturb the
SWA to the maximum or minimum price in the ten best
buy/sell orders at a given time-stamp.
Consider the sequence of order book snapshots used for
size-weighted average, {xi}, and the sequence of adversar-
ial orders (on a per-row basis), {ai}. We cannot simply add
these two quantities to compute the perturbed order book
since the adversarial orders may remain on the book after be-
ing placed. On the other hand, we cannot blindly propagate
the orders to the end of the snippet because transactions may
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occur in which adversarial orders are executed, removed
from the book, and therefore be excluded from subsequent
snapshots. Thus, denote the propagation function which ac-
cumulates adversarial orders and accounts for transactions,
returning the sequence of perturbations to the snapshots, by
p. Then, the perturbed sequence of order book snapshots
is {xi + δi} where {δi} = p({ai}). Finally, the input to a
model is SWA({xi + δi}).
4.2. Quantifying Perturbation Size
In order to determine just how sensitive our models are, we
must quantify the size of the perturbations being placed. We
consider three possible metrics: cost, capital required, and
relative size.
• We compute cost to the attacker as the change in the
total value of his or her assets from the start of the
snippet to the end. Assets include both cash and stocks.
For this reason, cost accounts for changes in the price
of stocks purchased when a buy order is filled (but we
do not include transaction costs). We operate under the
assumption that all attack orders are transacted when
other orders are transacted at the same price level.
• Capital required is the hypothetical total cost of exe-
cuting all orders placed by the attacker. This quantity
is the total dollar value of orders in the perturbation.
An agent would need to have this much capital to place
the orders.
• Finally, we quantify the relative size of our perturba-
tion as the size (number of shares) of the adversary’s
propagated perturbation as a percentage of total size
on the book during the snippet.
Since transactions occur infrequently at this time-scale, and
prices go up roughly as much as they go down, the average
cost across attacks is less than $1.00 for each asset-model
combination. For this reason, our crafting algorithms limit
perturbation size in terms of capital required. We denote
the capital required for an order sequence {ai} as C({ai}).
In addition, we measure cost and relative size in our experi-
ments.
4.3. Robustness to Random Noise
Before describing our attack, we establish a baseline by ran-
domly inserting orders instead of using optimization meth-
ods, and we propagate the perturbations through the order
book. We compare our attacks to this baseline to demon-
strate that the optimization process is actually responsible
for impairing classification. In fact, random attacks with a
high budget barely impair classification at all. See Table 2
for accuracy against a random attacker. All random attacks
have a budget over $2,000,000, a sum far higher than any
optimization-based attack we consider.
4.4. Crafting gradient-based attacks
We now introduce a simple adversarial attack for studying
model sensitivity. This attack is untargeted, meaning that it
degrades model performance by finding a small perturbation
that causes misclassification to any wrong label.
Consider a model, f , and a sequence of snapshots, {xi}
with label y. Our attacker solves the maximization problem,
max
{ai}
L(f({SWA(xi + δi)}), y),
with capital constraint C({ai}) ≤ c, where {δi} = p({ai}).
The adversary cannot perturb price (only size) in the snap-
shot, and all size entries must be integer-valued. To this end,
we perform gradient ascent on the cross-entropy loss, L,
using a random learning rate α ∼ U(0, α0) and the update
rule,
{ai}k ← {ai}k−1 + α∇L(f({SWA(xi + δi)}), y).
The attacker runs through this iterative method with a small
step size until either the model no longer predicts the correct
label, y, or C(Rr({ai})) exceeds the capital constraint, c,
where Rr = bx + rc is a floor operator that rounds size
entry x to the greatest integer less than or equal to x + r
(i.e. R0.3(0.8) = 1). When the attack terminates, we re-
turn the adversarial perturbation, Rr({ai}). We choose c
and r to be $100,000 and 0.95, respectively, in our exper-
iments. See Appendix A.2 for a discussion on choice of
attack hyperparameters.
Note 1 In a standard PGD attack, attacks are randomly ini-
tialized in an `∞ ball, and perturbations are projected onto
the ball each iteration. In contrast to `∞-bounded attacks,
there is no natural distribution for random initialization
within the set, {{ai} : C(ai) ≤ c}. Moreover, there is no
unique projection onto this set. Thus, we instead opt for a
randomized learning rate in order to inject randomness into
the optimization procedure (Chiang et al., 2019).
Table 2 depicts the effect of adversarial orders crafted in
this manner on price prediction. Empirically, these trading
models are not robust to low-budget perturbations. More-
over, gradient-based attacks are far more effective at fooling
our models than randomly placed orders with far higher
budget, indicating that our valuation models are robust to
noise but not to cleverly placed orders. MLPs, while gener-
ally of higher natural accuracy than linear models, are also
significantly less robust. In all experiments, MLPs achieve
lower robust accuracy, even with smaller perturbations. On
the other hand, LSTM models seemingly employ gradient
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MODEL ATEST(%) ARAND(%) AADV(%) CAPITAL ($) SIZE (%)
FORD (F) LINEAR 34.66 34.39 16.66 26, 808 0.4
MLP 36.56 33.12 7.22 24, 055 0.4
LSTM 36.40 37.26 21.76 10, 340 < 0.1
MODEL ATEST(%) ARAND(%) AADV(%) CAPITAL($) SIZE (%)
GENERAL ELECTRIC (GE) LINEAR 36.41 35.03 19.53 34, 513 0.6
MLP 36.87 33.65 9.87 23, 853 0.4
LSTM 35.65 33.01 20.59 12, 580 < 0.1
MODEL ATEST(%) ARAND(%) AADV(%) CAPITAL ($) SIZE (%)
NVIDIA (NVDA) LINEAR 34.15 37.47 28.98 53, 805 2.5
MLP 35.69 34.39 27.60 49, 556 2.4
LSTM 37.11 35.88 35.56 5, 327 < 0.1
Table 2. Model performance on clean and perturbed inputs. We denote accuracy on the test data, accuracy on randomly perturbed data,
and accuracy on adversarially perturbed data by Atest, Arand, and Aadv, respectively. We also report the average capital the adversary must
have before making an effective perturbation, and the average relative size of successful attacks, both of which are computed as described
in Section 4.2. The average cost to the attacker per asset is less than $1.00.
masking as they are far more difficult to attack using gradi-
ent information. To further confirm the gradient masking
hypothesis, we see below in Section 5 that LSTM models
are the most easily fooled models in the face of transferred
universal perturbations.
4.5. The Effect of High Price-to-Size Ratio
We found that valuation models for equities with high price
per share and low trading volume were difficult to attack.
For such stocks, the increments by which an adversary can
perturb the size-weighted average are coarse, so gradient-
based methods with rounding are ineffective. For example,
in the data we use, Nvidia stock costs ∼ $180/share com-
pared to ∼ $9/share for Ford stock during the data range we
considered. This fact, combined with roughly 5× lower trad-
ing volume, makes it difficult to perform low cost attacks,
or attacks with low relative size, on Nvidia. As a result
of this quantization effect, we are almost unable to impair
models on Nvidia. This observation leads us to believe that
price prediction on assets with this property is more robust
in general (at least using the class of SWA-based models
studies in our setting). In the ensuing sections, we focus
on Ford and General Electric stocks, which have relatively
higher volume and lower cost per share.
5. Universal Transfer Attack: A More
Feasible Threat Model
The adversarial attacks discussed above provide a useful
basis for analyzing model robustness but do not pose any
real security threat because of three unrealistic assumptions.
First, the attacker is performing an untargeted attack, mean-
ing that the attacker knows the class that a snippet belongs
to (i.e., whether it will go up, down, or remain), and is only
trying to cause the label to change to some other class. Fur-
thermore, attacks are crafted while looking at every row of
the order book simultaneously. For this reason, the attacker
may use knowledge about the end of a snippet when decid-
ing what orders to place in the book at the beginning of the
snippet. Third, the attacker must know their victim’s archi-
tecture and parameters. In short, the strategies displayed
above require the attacker to know the future and their op-
ponent’s proprietary technology, and entirely unrealistic
scenario.
In this section, we consider making universal perturbations
– we craft a single attack that works on a large number of
historical training snippets with the hope that it transfers to
unseen testing snippets. These attacks can be deployed in
real time without knowing the future. Furthermore, we use
targeted attacks, so that the attacker may anticipate the be-
havior of the victim. In order to add even more realism, we
use transfer attacks in which the attacker does not know the
parameters of the model they are attacking. In this situation,
we train surrogate models and use universal perturbations
generated on the surrogates to attack the victim.
We craft universal perturbations by solving
min
δ
∑
i
L(f({SWA({xi + δi)}), yt) + γR(δ),
where L is cross-entropy loss, {δi} = p({ai}), {xi} are
the order book snapshots in the training data, yt is a target
label, δ is a universal perturbation to the size entries, and
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Figure 2. The unperturbed and perturbed order books (top left and top right, respectively). The bottom two images show the unpropagated
and propagated adversarial perturbations (left and right, respectively). In this instance, the addition of the bottom right image to the clean
signal in the top left yields the perturbed input in the top right. Note that the difference between the perturbed and unperturbed signals is
not noticeable here, where the model was fooled into incorrectly classifying the SWA as going up.
R(δ) is a penalty term which may be used to encourage the
perturbation to require, for example, less size relative to the
size on the book. The perturbation, δ, represents the size of
orders placed by the adversary at particular price levels and
time stamps. That is, the adversary must only consider how
many levels a price is from the best offer rather than specific
dollar amounts. We solve this problem with stochastic gra-
dient descent by sampling training data and minimizing loss.
See Appendix A.2 for attack hyperparameters. We apply
this pre-computed sequence of adversarial orders to the test
data by propagating the orders through the order book for
each individual input sequence and adding to the original
clean snippet. We measure and report the success rate at
moving correctly classified inputs from outside the target
class into the target class.
We find that universal adversarial perturbations in this set-
ting work well. In particular, we were able to find universal
perturbations that are small relative to the order book and yet
fool the model a significant percentage of the time. More-
over, we find that these attacks transfer between models
and that our relative size penalty is effective at reducing the
budget of an attacker while maintaining a high fool rate. See
Table 3 for targeted universal perturbation transfer attack
results.
These targeted universal perturbations are prototypical pat-
terns for convincing a model to predict a particular SWA
movement. For example, to force the victim to predict a
downwards trend, the adversary places sell orders followed
by buy orders and finally more sell orders to feign down-
wards momentum in the SWA (See Figure 3). We find that
visualizing universal perturbations is helpful for interpreting
why our models make the decisions they do.
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ULINEAR UMLP
MODEL FOOLED SIZE FOOLED SIZE
LINEAR 9.5% 1.0% 11.90% 0.8%
MLP 23.75% 1.1% 36.10% 0.8%
LSTM 31.21% 0.9% 40.46% 0.8%
Table 3. Model performance on universal attacks (Ford data). We
denote the universal perturbations computed on the linear model
and on the MLP by Ulinear and UMLP, respectively. We craft univer-
sal adversarial perturbations on a linear model and an MLP and
assess the performance of three models under these attacks. Both
of these attacks were computed with a penalty on relative size.
6. Patterns in Adversarial Orders
We observe patterns in adversarial attacks that can help ex-
plain the behavior of classifiers. The non-universal attacks
on particular inputs highlight the vulnerability of the val-
uation models. For example, in Figure 2, the perturbation
is so small compared to the size on the book that a human
would not distinguish the attacked signal from the clean
one. The attack, however, is concentrated on the fringes
of the order book, much like a spoofing attack. Figure 3
shows a case in which a universal adversary has learned an
interpretable perturbation in which it creates a local min-
imum in the size-weighted average by alternately placing
perturbations on opposite sides of the book. Our relative
size penalty visibly decreases the size and concentration of
the perturbation without decreasing effectiveness.
Universal perturbations bring to light two important features
of these price predictors. The first is that targeted universal
perturbations, which are generally less effective, have a ma-
jor impact on the performance of these models. The models
are vulnerable even to these weak attacks. Second, the tar-
geted universal attacks expose interpretable model behavior.
In Figure 3, we see that the attacker creates local extrema
in the order book which cause the model to anticipate mean
reversion. Further visualizations of adversarial order book
perturbations can be found in Appendix A.3.
7. Discussion
This work introduces adversarial attacks to financial mod-
els both as a method for understanding model sensitivities
and as a potential threat. As seen in other applications of
adversarial machine learning, there are robustness tradeoffs
to be leveraged, and there is no free lunch. While neural
network models perform better at pattern recognition in
this setting than traditional linear valuation models, we find
them to be less robust. We further notice that the same ad-
versarial patterns that fool one model also fool others and
that these patterns are highly interpretable to humans. The
transferability of these attacks, combined with their ability
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Figure 3. Examples of two targeted universal adversarial attacks
computed on the same model (MLP trained on Ford data). The
perturbation on the top was computed without constraint, and when
transferred to test data and a different model, it fooled the victim
on 157 inputs (out of 341 correctly classified) and accounts for a
relative size on the book of 3.8%. The bottom perturbation is the
result of the same process with an added penalty on relative size.
The penalized attack shows a sparser perturbation with a relative
size of 0.9% while causing misclassification of almost the same
number of inputs (123).
to be effective with a small attack budget, suggests that
they could possibly be leveraged by a malicious agent with
limited knowledge of a victim.
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A. Appendix
A.1. Model Training
For each asset we train linear predictors, MLPs, and LSTMs. The linear models are trained for 5,000 iterations of SGD with
a batch size of 2,500 and an initial learning rate of 0.5. The learning rate is then decreased by a factor of 0.5 after iterations
50, 500, 1,000, 2,000, 3,000, 4,000 and 4,500. We conducted an architecture search, which led to MLP models of 4 hidden
layers, each of 8,000 neurons. The MLPs are trained for 3,000 iterations of SGD with a batch size of 3,000 and an initial
learning rate of 0.01. The learning rate decreases by a factor of 0.5 after iterations 10, 20, 100, 200, 400, 500, 1,000, 2,000,
and 2,500. Our architecture search for LSTM models led to LSTMs with 3 layers and a hidden size of 100 neurons. The
LSTMs are trained for 50 iterations of ADAM with a batch size of 2,000 and an initial learning rate of 0.01. The learning
rate decreases by a factor of 0.5 after iterations 25 and 40.
We perform training on a heterogeneous combination of Nvidia RTX 2080 Ti, P100, and GV100 GPUs.
A.2. Attack Details
During non-universal attacks, we use 200 steps and α0 = 40, so that α ∼ U(0, 40). The attack terminates on a given sample
as soon as the sample is misclassified, so that we rarely actually run through all 200 steps. The run-time of these attacks is
dominated by the gradient computation, and the worst-case time complexity of 200 gradient computations per sample is
rarely achieved.
For universal attacks, we adopt a similar procedure to (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2017). We start be initializing an attack,
{ai} to be zeros. Then, we sample batches of 50 training samples and perform 5 gradient descent steps on each one with a
random learning rate, α ∼ U(0, 10). Next, we average the resulting steps, and add 1.5 times this average to {ai}, clipping all
negative values. We use 200 batches to create one universal adversarial perturbation. In order to create sparse perturbations,
in some experiments, we use a penalty term which is 5 times the relative size of the perturbation.
In order to propagate perturbations through the order book in a differentiable way, we must store data in two forms: raw
order book snapshots and a form which stores size entries corresponding to the same price together. This doubles the space
complexity, but allows us to parallelize propagation. During propagation, each entry is touched exactly twice, so the process
is O(n).
A.3. Additional Visualizations
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Figure 4. Examples of two targeted universal adversarial attacks computed on the same linear model on Ford data. The perturbation on the
left was computed without constraint, while the perturbation to the right is the result of the same process with an added penalty on relative
size. The penalized attack shows a sparser perturbation which is still nearly as effective at fooling the model.
